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Abstract 
 
Moral hazard is widely reported as a problem in credit and insurance markets, mainly 
arising from information asymmetry. Although theorists have attempted to explain how 
group lending with joint liability can be an important tool for mitigating moral hazard among 
the poor, empirical studies are rare and sometimes give mixed results. In Malawi, for 
example, although, group lending with joint liability has been practiced for nearly four 
decades, the unwillingness to repay loans remains the single major cause of default. This 
paper examines the extent of occurrence of moral hazard and investigates its determinants of 
occurrence among joint liability lending programs from Malawi, using group level data from 
99 farm and non-farm credit groups. Results reveal that peer selection, peer monitoring, peer 
pressure, dynamic incentives and variables capturing the extent of matching problems 
explain most of the variation in the incidence of moral hazard among credit groups. The 
implications are that joint liability lending institutions will continue to rely on social cohesion 
and dynamic incentives as a means to enhancing their performance which has a direct 
implication on their outreach, impact and sustainability. 
 
Key words: moral hazard, joint liability, dynamic incentives, group lending, Malawi                .  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Imperfect information causes at least four problems in credit markets, namely, adverse 
selection, moral hazard, lack of insurance and lack of enforcement. It is now common 
knowledge that, moral hazard, coupled with the lack of collateral by the poor is the key 
reason why credit markets fail for them. The problem of moral hazard may arise when 
individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions such that their privately taken actions 
affect the probability distribution of the outcome. It occurs in a principal-agent relationship 
when actions taken by an agent are not pareto-optimal (Holmstrom, 1979).  
Joint Liability Lending (JLL) is celebrated as a contractual innovation that has achieved 
the apparent miracle of enabling previously marginalized borrowers to lift themselves up by 
their own bootstraps by creating ‘social collateral’ to replace the missing physical collateral 
that excluded them from access to more traditional forms of finance (Conning 2000). 
Nevertheless, the problem with joint liability lending programs is that the poor are given 
access to credit without collateral, and in the event of default, they can not be punished 
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beyond a mere denial of future access to credit. This form of limited liability can induce 
borrowers to take risky decisions.   
 
In an effort to fully explain the success of JLL in mitigating moral hazard and enhancing 
repayment, theorists have proposed models that attempt to explain how this is possible.  
Among the most notable theories of moral hazard are models by Stiglitz (1990) and Ghatak 
and Guinnane (1999).  Stiglitz shows how peer monitoring under joint liability lending can 
be used to mitigate moral hazard.  Through JLL, it is assumed that group members, who are 
jointly liable to the loan, will be induced to monitor each other’s investment decisions and 
effort, thereby, reducing the cost of monitoring by the lending institution and consequently 
mitigating moral hazard. Thus, borrowers are given tasks of both managing their loan, and 
monitoring peers to ensure that they take safe decisions that would protect them from falling 
into repayment problems. However, in reality, monitoring can be costly and thus the 
assumption made by Stiglitz cannot hold.  
 
As a diversion from a model by Stiglitz, Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) propose a 
modification on the assumptions of costless monitoring, by showing that peer monitoring is 
costly. Further, they show the condition under which optimal contracts can still be achieved 
taking into account the cost of monitoring. They also add that a borrower’s willingness to 
repay the loan will depend on how they value the access to further loans from the same 
institution. Ghatak and Guinnane observe that if a borrower’s project yields enough output  
so that he/she is able to repay the loan, he/she will do it only if the benefit of defaulting, the 
interest, is less than the (discounted) net benefit of continued access to credit.  This raises 
the question: ‘To what extent does the value of future access to credit reduce the incidence 
of moral hazard?’  Following the proposed theories of moral hazard, only a limited number 
of empirical studies have been conducted to test their validity. 
 
In Malawi moral hazard is common occurrence among credit groups. Diagne et al (2000) 
note that peer monitoring rarely occurs in credit groups from Malawi and that when it 
occurs it does not lead to improvements in repayment because the main reason for default in 
the Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC) credit groups is the unwillingness to repay 
(moral hazard) and not the inability to repay. The unwillingness to repay was found to be the 
first cause of default among the MRFC credit groups. It accounted for 25 percent of all 
defaults in MRFC credit groups. However, no study has been conducted in Malawi to assess 
the driving forces behind such high incidences of moral hazard. Thus, the objective of this 
paper is to examine the extent to which moral hazard occurs in credit groups and analyse 
determinants of the likelihood of its occurrence. It is an attempt to contribute to moral 
hazard literature by testing the extent to which peer selection, peer monitoring, social ties, 
peer pressure, dynamic incentives and matching problems influence the incidence of moral 
hazard. We adopt a theoretical framework proposed by Ghatak and Guinnane(1999) with 
some extensions proposed by Diagne (1998),  Paxton (1996) and de Aghion (1999). We use 
data from Malawi, collected by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in 
1999. The data comes from 99 credit groups, all of which are beneficiaries of the Malawi 
Rural Finance Company’s (MRFC) farm and non-farm loans.  In section 2,  we present a 
brief review of literature. The theoretical framework and the description of data are 
presented in section 3 and 4, respectively. In section 5,  we present and discuss results, while 
section 6 concludes.    
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2.  Moral hazard in group based credit: a review of theories and related research 
 
2.1  The dynamics of joint liability lending   
 
Matin (1997) describes joint liability as a contract in which the provision of the private 
good, such as an individual’s access to credit, is made conditional on the provision of the 
public good, such group repayment. It refers to a situation in which two or more parties are 
liable for repayment of a debt or obligation and a creditor can be compensated from them 
either individually or jointly. Most group loan contracts in developing countries have a joint 
liability clause. This partly explains the belief that joint liability lending is a potential break 
through strategy in economic development as it enables the poor, for example without land 
title or collateral to access group loans that they would otherwise never access individually. 
The premise of group lending with joint liability is that if one borrower cannot pay a loan, 
then other members of the joint liability group will do so (Ahlin and Townsend 2003).   
 
Figure 1 shows a relational presentation of loan transactions and stages in the joint 
liability lending model starting from identification of borrowers through to repayment. Each 
stage in the figure is associated with a problem that the joint liability clause is assumed to 
address, and a hypothetical or theoretical solution. Following the loan receipt are the stages 
of monitoring, return realization, repayment or non-repayment. The process ends with 
penalties of non-refinancing in case of default.  
At the beginning of the period you have a pool of potential borrowers trying to access 
credit.  However, borrowing is conditioned upon group affiliation. Realizing that a 
borrowing group will sign a joint liability contract with the lender, each borrower, through 
peer selection tries to match with members of similar risk type. As proposed by Ghatak 
(1999a), the self-section process reduces the incidence of adverse selection. 
Peer 
selection 
Adverse 
selection 
Loan contract 
investment 
Ex-ante Moral 
Hazard (project 
choice) 
Repay 
Failure 
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liability 
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enforcement) 
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Figure 1: A dynamic presentation of problems and solutions in a multistage joint liability loan 
Source: Adopted with some modification from Sadoulet (2004)  
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Following the selection stage is the investment period. At this stage, the lender is faced 
with an ex ante moral hazard problem. This occurs when a borrower either decides to invest 
in a risky project or misuses the funds or when the borrower does not apply enough effort 
to manage the investment, which may lead to low returns. In theory peer monitoring can be 
used to mitigate this problem. However, complementary monitoring by the officers from 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) can also significantly reduce the incidence ex-ante moral 
hazard. Since monitoring by MFI officers is assumed to be costly and unsustainable, joint 
liability lending emphasizes on monitoring by peers.  
 
The third stage involves investment outcomes. The investment may fail due to a number 
of reasons, some of which are beyond the control of the borrowers such as idiosyncratic 
shocks. The problem now is that there exists limited liability. Under joint liability lending 
members that do not have repayment problems can assist in paying the defaulters’ loan 
(intra-group insurance). The final problem is related to ex-post moral hazard. This is a 
second dimension of the general moral hazard issue in lending contracts. It occurs when the 
levels of effort have been carried out and the returns of the investment have been realized, 
when a borrower finds it optimal to diverge the funds for repayment of the loan to other 
purposes. In joint liability loans, implementing peer pressure and social sanctions can solve 
the problem of ex-post moral hazard. 
 
2.2 Empirical studies 
 
A very limited number of empirical studies have been conducted on determinants of 
moral hazard in JLL schemes. Among the few attempts are studies by Wydick (1999) and 
Hermes et al (2005). Wydick assesses the incidence of moral hazard among credit groups in 
Guatemala and provides evidence that joint liability works because of social cohesion and 
better information flow. Nevertheless, the study fails to assess the extent to which other key 
variables of group dynamics such as, dynamic incentives, sanctions and matching problems 
influence the incidence of moral hazard. Hermes et al (2005) study the incidence of moral 
hazard among credit groups from Eritrea and observe that social ties and peer monitoring 
are key factors influencing the likelihood of moral hazard among borrowers.   
 
The role of peer selection in mitigating adverse selection and hence moral hazard is 
discussed by Ghatak (1999b). Ghatak argues that despite information asymmetry, joint 
liability lending allows for pareto superior equilibrium in credit markets if group formation is 
conducted appropriately. Ghatak shows how groups formed through self selection will result 
into members with homogenous quality. Ghatak shows that through the assortative 
matching process, groups end up with less risk borrowers, directly reducing moral hazard, 
which leads to a lower equilibrium interest rate leading to a pareto superior outcome relative 
to individual lending.  
 
The significance of peer monitoring in improving repayments in group credit is 
highlighted by a number of authors. Stiglitz (1990), for example, observes that the major 
problem facing MFIs is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so 
that the likelihood of repayments is enhanced. Stiglitz notes that a partial solution to this 
problem is peer monitoring: giving neighbours or group members the responsibility to 
monitor each other. The incentive for peer monitoring comes from the fact that peers are 
supposed to pay loans for any defaulting group members. Studying the incentive rationale 
for the use of group lending as a method of financing liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs, 
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Che (2002) observes that the joint liability lowers the liquidity risk of default but creates a 
free-riding problem. Che points out that in the static setting, the free-riding problem 
dominates the liquidity risk effect, thus making group lending unattractive. However, when 
the projects are repeated over time, the joint liability feature provides the group members 
with a credible means of exercising peer monitoring and sanctioning, which can make the 
group lending attractive, relative to individual lending.  
 
In contrast to the emphasis on peer monitoring, Fuglesang et al., (1993)  argue that the 
monitoring by lending institutions is all that matters most when it comes to improving 
repayment rates. They observe that even micro lenders that are famous for the joint liability 
methodology such as the Grameen of Bangladesh do in fact also rely heavily upon highly 
motivated and locally recruited loan staff officers as monitors and organizers. Following this 
observation, Conning (2000) questions whether such delegated monitors might not be just as 
good at monitoring, and perhaps better at enforcing loan repayment than peer monitors, in 
which case joint liability clauses my be superfluous or may be serving other purposes.  
 
The role of peer pressure is discussed by Diagne (1998). Diagne proposes a peer 
pressure model in which borrowers are incompletely informed about their partners 
willingness to apply or tolerate social sanctions and shows how peer pressure can be used to 
mitigate default in situations where potential defaulters are intolerant of sanctions. An 
extension of the model by Diagne (1998) and Paxton (1996) further proposes the 
importance of   dynamic incentives and incentive match in inducing safe behaviour among 
borrowers.  
 
The role of sanctions in enhancing the willingness of individuals to repay their loans is 
also discussed in Besley and Coate (1995). They show how moderately successful group 
members may wilfully decide not to repay their loans because of the burden of having to 
repay the unsuccessful members´ loan.  They note however, that in the presence of strong 
social ties among group members, wilful default is minimized because potential defaulters 
are afraid of facing sanctions from both the bank and the community. 
 
Ahlin and Townsend (2003) further attempt to extend existing repayment models by 
testing some unexamined dimensions of the models. One such test is the introduction of 
productivity differences across groups. Based on the assumption that the production 
function can be decomposed multiplicatively into a piece related to the risk factor and a 
piece related to productive inputs, such as loaned capital and human capital, they assign the 
derivative of the utility difference with respect to human capital. In their empirical analysis 
they find that productivity represented by the average level of education positively influences 
repayment. However, the average land holding size (another productivity variable considered 
in the model) had no effect on repayment performance. In the next section we present a 
theoretical framework on moral hazard and its extensions.   
 
3.  Theoretical and empirical framework 
 
Following Salanie (2000), the standard moral hazard model assumes that the principal 
cannot directly observe the effort level of the agent. Once a contract has been signed the 
agent must choose between n possible actions ni aa .,,......... .These actions produce one 
among m outcomes which we may denote mxx ........,,.........1 . Assume further that when the 
agent chooses action ia , the Principal observes the outcome jx with a probability ijp  that is 
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positive. The agent receives a wage jw  when the Principal observes the outcome jx .  The 
income for the principal is ( jj wx − ). The specification for the Agent’s von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function can be written as 
awu −)(  ,  where u    is increasing and concave. Assuming neutrality for the principal as in 
most of the literature, his von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is written as 
wx −  . When the Principal offers a contract jw  the agent’s utility maximization problem 
can be written as : 





−∑
=
=
m
j
ijij
ni
awupMax
1
),.....1
)(        (1) 
If the agent chooses ia  then the (n-1) incentive constraints is  
 ∑
=
−
m
j
ijij awup
1
)(  ∑
=
−≥
m
j
kjkj awup
1
)(                    (ICk)     (2) 
where k=1, …..n and ik ≠ . 
The agents’ utility maximization problem is also subject to the following (individual 
rationality constraint) participation constraint: 
µ≥−∑
=
m
j
ijij awup
1
)(                                               (IR)    (3) 
where µ  is the utility derived from taking an outside option. Building on the basic principles 
stated in the standard model specified above, Stiglitz (1990) proposes a moral hazard model 
for credit markets which can be presented in two stages. First the model is presented under 
individual lending and then later a scenario under group lending is presented. The model 
shows that joint liability lending can be used to mitigate the moral hazard problem among 
group members.  The model starts by assuming a single borrowers loan (individual liability) 
under the assumption that borrowers are risk neutral. Output takes two values, high HY  and 
low LY . Normalizing the low output values to 0, the output is high with probability p  and 0 
otherwise. Assuming that each project requires 1 unit of capital, then the repayment to the 
lender plus interest equals 1>ρ . Borrowers will only be willing to borrow if the utility from 
borrowing (which results from the payoffs) is no smaller than some utility µ that represents 
the utility the agent can obtain by taking on an outside option. This participation constraint, 
which also implies that the projects are socially profitable, can be expressed as follows: 
 µρ ≥−HpY           (5) 
Borrowers choose actions, which can be thought of as a level of effort [ ]1,0∈p , for which 
they incur a disutility cost of  2
2
1
pγ  (where γ  >0). Following this specification a social 
surplus and the equilibrium p which is subject to moral hazard can be computed. Under 
individual lending the following equilibrium value of p will be chosen3  
 
γ
ργ
2
4)( 2 −+
=
HH YY
p         (6) 
Under joint liability scenario it is assumed that when a borrower’s project fails the partner is 
liable for the amount q. This is an incentive for each member to care about the safety of the 
project chosen by the peers and it is acknowledged as a justification for peer monitoring.  If 
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one of the members chooses an action  ´p  then the payoff function of a borrower who 
chooses action p is 
.
2
1
´)1(max 2
)(
ppqprppY H
p
γ−−−−        (7) 
Assume that the borrower chooses action  p to maximize his individual payoff, taking his 
partner’s action 'p  as given. Then her best response function is given by: 
'.p
qqrY
p
H
γγ
+
−−
=         (8) 
At the equilibrium the  p under joint liability just like under individual liability has two values 
while the denominator of the joint liability expression is lower than that of the individual 
liability. The model shows how the equilibrium value of p  and hence repayment rate is 
higher under joint liability compared to individual lending. 
 
The model outlined above assumes that members can monitor each others actions 
perfectly at no cost, as well as they enforce any agreements regarding their choice of p. 
 
However, in reality, peer monitoring can be costly. In addition, joint liability lending 
allows for the imposition of sanctions on group members that renege on their repayment 
promises. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), therefore, make an extension of this model by 
including the cost of monitoring and considerations for the effect of sanctions in choosing 
the level of p4. Diagne (1998) further makes extensions to the model by including the impact 
peer pressure and dynamic incentives in inducing repayment.  Ahlin and Townsend (2003) 
propose the inclusion of productivity differences across groups and show how high 
productivity leads to a reduction in moral hazard through an increase in payoffs for safe 
projects.  
 
Guided by this theoretical framework we identify variables that are associated with the 
incidence of moral hazard from the data set.  The empirical strategy focuses on testing 
whether or not particular covariates, vector )........( 1 nXXX = are associated with the 
incidence of moral hazard. 
The probability of moral hazard in a specific group g as a function of covariates can be 
written as gg XHP |1( = ). This leads to the following likelihood function: 
 [ ] gg HggHggG
g
XHPXHP
−
=
=−=∏
1
1
)|1(1)|1(       (9) 
The moral hazard model )|1( gg XHP =  can thus be written as a function )'( gXP β , 
where β  is an 1χM  vector of parameters and gX  is an 1χM  vector containing group g´s 
values for the M covariates.   
The likelihood of a group reporting the incidence of moral hazard is assumed to be 
determined by a latent variable y*  which can be expressed as follows in a regression 
relationship: 
iiiiy µβ +Χ= '*          (10) 
                                                 
4
 For  details see  Ghatak and Guinnane  
 8 
where X is a vector of characteristics, which, it is hypothesized that they affect the likelihood 
of the occurrence of moral hazard, i'β  is a vector of coefficients for variables associated with 
moral hazard.  
In practice y* is unobservable. What we observe is a dummy variable defined as 
1=y    if  0* >iy         (11) 
 0=y      otherwise 
 From the relations  2 and 3 we get  
iii Xuobyob '(Pr)1(Pr β−>==        (12) 
           = )'(1 iXF β−−  
In this case the observed values of y are just realizations of a binomial process with 
probabilities given by  ( 12) (Maddala 1997).  Hence the likelihood function is 
 
[ ])'(1)'(
10
i
y
i
y
XFXFL
ii
ββ −−Π−Π=
==
.       (13) 
 
The functional form of  F  in (13) will depend on the assumptions made about iµ  in (10). 
 
In this study we assume that iµ  are ),0(
2δIN . Because of this assumption of a 
cumulative normal distribution of the error terms, the estimation of determinants of moral 
hazard is done using the probit model.  
The moral hazard model was specified as follows:     (14) 
ii
Ctr
i
ii
i
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Where: 
 1x ´s are a set of variables (Pr=2) that measure group productivity 
2x ´s are a set of variables (Scr=4) that measure the quality of screening 
3x ´s are a set of variables (pm=3) that measure the quality of peer monitoring 
4x ´s are a set of variables (St=6) that measure the strength of social ties within the group 
5x ´s are a set of variables (Pp=2) that measure the quality of peer pressure 
6x ´s are a set of variables (Dinc=2) that measure the quality of dynamic incentives 
7x ´s are a set of variables (Im=3) that the proxy the degree of incentive match 
8x ´s are a set of variables (Ctr=5) that are control variables  
 
 
4.  Data 
 
The study is based on data collected by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) in 1999 from 99 MRFC credit groups located  in 4 of the 27 satellite offices of 
MRFC. The four satellite offices are located in 4 different districts of Malawi.  The groups 
were randomly selected based on information obtained from MRFC’s Management 
Information System. The four sites cover the three regions of Malawi (Central , South and 
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North)5. Because of logistical constraints, the sample frame of the groups in each satellite 
office was restricted to 2 field offices only6.  
 
Using the 1997 repayment status, groups were classified into 3 categories: fully-paid 
groups, partially-paid groups and nothing-paid groups. A stratified random sampling 
procedure was then used to randomly select the sample groups from the three selected 
strata. A group was classified as fully paid if the 1997 group loan was fully paid. It was 
classified as a partially-paid group if only part of the 1997 group loan had been paid at the 
time of the survey. And a group was classified as nothing-paid if no member had paid 
anything for the 1997 loan. For each group, a group leader and three randomly selected 
members were interviewed for each group. One non-participant and one past participant 
randomly selected but living in the same village were also interviewed. A detailed structured 
questionnaire covering the formation, composition and repayment history of the group was 
administered to each respondent. The questionnaire specifically included questions aimed at 
quantifying the degree of information asymmetry within each group and the extent to which 
peer selection, peer monitoring and peer pressure had been taking place. Also collected using 
the questionnaire was the extent to which the joint-liability has been enforced in each loan 
cycle.   
 
 
4.1   Formation structure and conduct of the groups 
 
The sample consisted of both farm and non-farm credit groups. As indicated in Figure 2, 
the majority were tobacco credit groups (47%), followed by the non-farm business groups 
(28%). Maize and cotton groups accounted for 17 percent and 8 percent of the sample, 
respectively.   
 
 
These four types of credit groups belong to three different joint liability programs 
operated by MRFC: MRFC seasonal agricultural loans, Mudzi seasonal agricultural loans,  
and Mudzi non-farm businesses. There are significant differences in the design, orientation, 
and target population of the programs. There are also significant differences in the design 
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6
 The average number of offices per satellite office is 5 
Tobacco, 47 
Maize, 17 
Cotton, 8 
Non-farm business, 28 
Figure 2: Types of credit groups 
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and operation between the groups in the seasonal agricultural programs depending on the 
type of crop for which the loans are intended (tobacco, maize,  cotton and rice ( Diagne et al 
2000). 
 
Based on information from group leaders, Table 1 indicates that only 25 percent of the 
groups were formed by ordinary village residents on their own (through peer selection). The 
agricultural extension workers (Field Assistants) and the Credit Assistants formed 44 percent 
and 16 percent of the groups, respectively7.  The importance of the FA’s in the formation of 
the groups is consistent with the policy followed by MRFC with respect to group formation. 
The policy consists of letting the agricultural extension workers, who are under the ministry 
of Agriculture and are called Field Assistants (FA) in Malawi, identify and propose to its 
Credit Assistants (CA) the groups wanting to borrow from MRFC. The CAs then perform 
the screening and undertake the group training activities. It is generally assumed from the 
perspective of MRFC that groups identified and proposed by the FAs have been 
endogenously formed through a peer selection process. It is however not clear as to the 
extent to which such groups whose formation was initiated by FAs and CAs can be 
considered to be endogenously self formed. Anecdotal stories during the field survey, 
however, indicated that FAs exerted a lot of influence on who to be included in the groups. 
In a number of cases FAs included friends and relatives in the credit groups which led to 
group default in some cases. It appeared, however, that the CAs were usually more objective 
when selecting members in a group than the FAs as stories of default due to biased selection 
were rarely reported in groups formed by CAs. Village chiefs formed about 11 percent of the 
credit groups. In some cases chiefs were also reported to be involved in the same 
malpractices of including relatives and friends during group formation. In addition although 
chiefs only formed 11 percent of the groups, their influence is also felt in groups that were 
formed by the FAs or CAs because as indicated in Table 1, in about 24 percent of the 
groups formed by the FAs/CAs, village chiefs had called them to the village to come and 
form the groups. Ordinary villagers were reported to have called the FAs/CAs in only 17 
percent of the groups. 
Due to the nature of their main job, FAs appear to have more influence in initiating the 
formation of tobacco groups (47%) and maize groups (41%) compared to cotton groups 
(27%) and business groups (23%). In contrast, the CAs are more influential in the formation 
of non-farm business groups (25%) compared to tobacco (12%), cotton (15%) and maize 
(19%). 
The issue of screening was addressed by asking group leaders if some individuals that 
had wanted to join the group had their applications turned down. Results indicate that about 
43 percent of the groups showed some evidence of screening, as indicated by the positive 
number of membership applications rejected when the group was being formed. On average 
about 4 members per group were rejected.  Screening is more evident in maize groups (51%) 
than in tobacco (43%), non-farm business (42%) and cotton (31%). The evidence of high 
levels of screening among maize groups may be attributed to the fact that maize groups lack 
a built-in mechanism for self selection because maize is a main staple food in Malawi and has 
                                                 
7 Diagne et al 2000, emphasizes that Agricultural Extension workers, also known as Field Assistants in Malawi, 
play a very important role in the formation of MRFC credit groups. For planning and administration purposes, 
Malawi is divided into Extension Planning Areas (EPAs) headed by an Agricultural Development Officer 
(ADO). MRFC field credit offices (which are the first contact points of borrowers) are located in the EPA 
offices and handle both the farm and non-farm groups.  In all EPAs both the Credit Assistant and the Field 
Assistant work under the direct supervision of the ADO although the first is a paid employee of MRFC while 
the Field Assistant and the ADO are employees of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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to be grown by almost all farmers. On the other hand the capital and labour intensive nature 
of tobacco allows for the self selection process to start earlier.  
 
About 30 percent of the groups had been previously affiliated to other credit institutions 
before joining MRFC.  Thus despite the screening process members from past failed credit 
programs where loans may not have been rigorously collected, leading to default were part 
of the existing MRFC groups. A matter of fact according to Diagne et. al (2000) about 80 
percent of the groups surveyed included past members of SACA or another NGO. Overall 
about 41 percent of group members were either past SACA members or members from 
another NGO.  The nature in which group formation takes place is evidence of how difficult 
it can be to exclude risky borrowers from groups since village chiefs or other local 
authorities can impose themselves to the groups either directly or indirectly through their 
relatives and friends. Potentially good borrowers are usually left with no choice except 
joining a group that is full of risky borrowers for purposes of receiving credit. 
 
Table 1:  Characteristics of groups by type 
 
Characteristic Tobacco 
(n=46) 
Maize  
(n=16) 
Cotton/Rice 
(n=8) 
Non-farm 
business 
(n=28) 
Total 
(n=99) 
Who initiated the group      
Village chief (%) 9 6 25 14 11 
Ordinary village residents(%) 22 44 38 14 25 
MRFC credit assistant (%) 11 19 13 25 16 
Field Assistant (extension) (%) 58 25 25 39 44 
Other 0 6 25 7 3 
Who called the FA/CA      
    Nobody 58 47 71 61 58 
    Village Chief 25 37 11 15 24 
    Ordinary villagers 13 14 18 24 17 
Age of the group (years) 4 5 8 3 4 
Evidence of screening (%) 43 51 31 42 43 
Average number rejected 4 4 3 4 4 
Previously affiliates of other 
NGOs/past SACA 
20 13 25 57 30 
Source: RDD/IFPRI 1999 Rural Finance Survey 
 
 
4.2  Group composition 
 
Questions on group composition mainly focused on homogeneity of groups in terms of 
wealth, social status gender and kinship. Results in Table 2 indicate that 62 percent of the 
groups contained members that were slightly heterogeneous in terms of wealth while only 21 
percent indicated that the group members were very heterogeneous. The remaining 17 
percent indicated that group members were homogenous. With regards to gender 
composition, 55 percent of the groups were mixed with about 66 percent women 
composition.  
As regards the social status, 90 percent of the groups included members from families of 
their respective village authorities (village chiefs or other traditional authorities). About 8% 
included members from families of FAs or CAs. Groups are generally composed of 
members from more than one village. In about 21 percent of the groups where members 
came from more than one village the average number of villages from which members came 
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was 3. About 78 percent of the groups contained members from previous credit programs. 
In general PASTSACA members accounted for 41 percent of the group members. A good 
proportion of groups exercise sanctioning (members are excluded for default) as witnessed 
by 29 percent of the groups in which members were excluded for default. As a result of the 
exclusion of defaulting members, groups allow new members to join. As indicated in Table 
2, 26 percent of the groups admitted new members in their groups during the respective loan 
cycle. 
 
Table 2: Group composition 
 
 Tobacco 
(n=46) 
Maize  
(n=16) 
Cotton 
(n=8) 
Non-farm 
business 
(n=28) 
Total 
(n=99) 
Group wealth distribution       
About the same (%) 13 27 59 11 16 
Slightly different (%) 65 60 25 65 62 
Very different (%) 23 13 16 24 21 
Group with mixed gender (%) 62 77 91 25 55 
Percent women in a group (%) 50 56 26 100 66 
Groups with members from   
village authority  (%) 
93 86 76 89 90 
% of member from 
villages authority’s family (%) 
25 21 15 13 20 
Groups with family members form 
CA or FA family (%) 
10 2 12 8 8 
Number of villages from which 
members come 
3 2 3 2 3 
Groups with members from PAST 
SACA or another NGO (%) 
80 95 73 65 78 
% members from PAST SACA or 
another NGO 
38 73 43 26 41 
Evidence of sanctions ( members 
excluded for default) 
38 23 8 22 29 
Groups with new members 
admitted (%) 
18 51 26 22 26 
Source: RDD/IFPRI 1999 Rural Finance Survey 
 
 
4.3  Peer monitoring and peer pressure 
  
Peer monitoring is an important aspect of joint liability lending. In the IFPRI study peer 
monitoring was assessed by examining the extent to which members have access to 
information and by assessing the extent to which group members are willing to engage in 
peer monitoring activities to enforce proper loan use and report misuse of loans.  The extent 
of peer monitoring was also assessed by observing rules followed by groups. One such rule 
that directly relates to monitoring is a rule on joint enterprise ownership. Groups were asked 
whether they had any rules that encouraged joint ownership of enterprises. 
Table 3 shows the extent of group members general knowledge of the composition of 
groups. As can be seen, 14 percent of the members did not have any general knowledge of 
the sizes and demographic composition of their respective groups. Also about 15 percent 
lacked knowledge about the sizes and terms of their group loans. Lack of knowledge on the 
general characteristics of the group is an indication that members are not actively involved in 
monitoring. The results also reveal that even among members that claimed to know 
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something about the characteristics in question there was a wide variation in their responses 
regarding group characteristics indicating that information flow among members belonging 
to the same group was limited to some extent. The average number of group meetings 
attended by the CA in each group per year was 14. This translates into slightly more than a 
visit per year per month.   Field Assistants were said to be more influential in their 
monitoring activities because of the nature of their work. The average number of meetings 
held by members without the presence of the CA was 21 per year while the average number 
of non-meeting follow-up visits to the chairpersons and defaulting members by the CA was 
11 per year. 
 
Peer pressure was defined to take place when members complained to the village 
authorities or took (threatened to take) punitive action against defaulters. As indicated in 
Table 3, peer pressure was applied in 39% of all groups before or after the due date. 
Although peer pressure was applied in 57 percent of the groups where loans were partially 
paid before due date, it was only successful in inducing some defaulters to repay in 37% of 
the groups. This shows how less frequent peer pressure takes in joint liability groups from 
Malawi and how more likely it is to fail than succeed in inducing defaulters to repay their 
loans. 
 
Table 3: Extent of group members’ general knowledge of the composition of groups and 
peer pressure 
 
Characteristic  Tobacco 
(n=46) 
Maize  
(n=16) 
Cotton 
(n=8) 
Non-farm 
business 
(n=28) 
Total 
(n=99) 
Peer Monitoring      
  Proportion with no general knowledge of       
composition (%) 
8 34 32 13 14 
 Proportion with no knowledge of total  
Group loan size and terms of the loan (%) 
11 25 29 16 15 
Number of meting by CA per year 14 13 16 16 14 
Number of  meetings  without CA 20 19 28 22 21 
Number of non-meeting visits by CA 11 11 11 10 11 
Rules encourage joint enterprise ownership 66 53 50 43 56 
Peer pressure       
Groups where peer pressure was 
 applied after or before  due date(%) 
35 54 39 37 39 
Peer pressure before due date (fully paid 
groups) (%) 
17 29 11 18 19 
Peer pressure before due date (not fully paid 
groups) (%) 
55 87 45 47 57 
Peer  pressure applied successfully (%) 23 80 45 36 37 
Source: RDD/IFPRI 1999 Rural Finance Survey 
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4.5  Group repayment outcomes and moral hazard 
 
Table 4 shows ex-post group repayment outcomes. In general, 23 percent of the total 
loan was defaulted.  Delinquency rates were lowest among tobacco groups (14%) mainly due 
to the fact that MRFC makes direct loan deductions from tobacco sales at the point of sale. 
The delinquency rates were highest among cotton (42%), and non-farm business groups 
(31%). With regards to group repayment status, results indicate that 51 percent of the groups 
were partially paid while 49 percent were fully paid groups. There are no significant 
differences in group repayment status across the four types of groups.  
 
Table 4: Ex-post group repayment out comes and incidence of moral hazard 
 
 Type of group Total 
 
 Tobacco 
(n=46) 
Maize  
(n=16) 
Cotton 
(n=8) 
Non-farm 
business 
(n=28) 
 (n=99) 
Delinquency rates (%) of total loan value 14 27 42 31 23 
Group repayment status by due date (%)      
     Fully paid group 51 50 0 53 49 
     Partially paid group 49 50 100 47 51 
Reasons for default (%)      
Wilful default (able but unwilling)  25 36 17 21 25 
Failure caused by natural disasters 20 36 25 7 18 
Failure cause by mismanagement 8 8 39 24 16 
Not enough profit 20 14 24 36 24 
Theft  4 0 0 1 2 
Family problems 5 0 2 4 4 
Illness  2 0 0 3 2 
Death of borrower 4 0 1 1 2 
Others  13 6 2 2 7 
Source: RDD/IFPRI 1999 Rural Finance Survey 
 
As regards the reasons for default, twenty five percent defaulted wilfully. Wilful default 
occurs when individuals have enough return to repay the loan but are unwilling to pay which 
is a form of ex-post moral hazard.  Loan default due to miss-management (ex-ante moral 
hazard) was reported in 16 percent of the groups. This gives a total of 41 percent of the loan 
defaults caused by moral hazard. The incidence of moral hazard is highest among maize 
groups (36%) implying that they probably lack some mechanism of enforcing screening and 
repayment.  Other major causes of default include low profits (24%) and failure caused by 
natural disasters (18%). The high incidence of moral hazard is used as a justification in this 
study to assess factors that can be used to explain such high incidences. 
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4.6  Description of Variables in the model 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable is dichotomous taking the value of one if the group reported the 
incidence of moral hazard and it is zero otherwise. The incidence of moral hazard in each 
credit group was captured by asking the chairperson of each group about whether some 
members had defaulted wilfully, or whether they had misused loan funds that were meant 
for an investment. Normally, group leaders know the behaviour of all members in the group 
and thus we expect the information they provide to be reliable.  Following this question, it 
was possible to observe both ex post and ex ante moral hazard. From the 99 credit groups, 46 
groups reported the incidence of moral hazard. It should be pointed out, however, that not 
all moral hazard leads to group default as members may contribute to pay the defaulters’ 
loan.    
 
Explanatory variables 
 
From the theoretical framework discussed earlier, the empirical specification is based on 
8 categories of explanatory variables whose full descriptions and a priori expectations of 
their effect on moral hazard are defined below. The explanatory variables in the model 
include peer selection, peer monitoring variables, screening, variables that capture the extent 
of social ties, peer pressure and sanctions. In addition to these variables we use this study to 
test the significance of extra variables, which have been reported in literature as having 
potential for inducing or mitigating moral hazard behaviour among borrowers. Such 
additional variables are in the following categories: productivity variables, dynamic incentives 
and variables that capture matching problems. Descriptive statistics of the explanatory 
variables are presented in Appendix 2 
 
a)  Factors of production 
 
Following Ahlin and Townsend (2003) we include factors of production in the model. 
The intuition is that higher productivity increases the payoff of safe projects relative to risky 
projects. This leads to the softening of the moral hazard problem and it makes monitoring 
more effective. For this study we use two variables to capture group productivity, namely, 
the land holding of group members in acres, (AVGLAND) and the average years of 
education of the group members (EDUCATION). We expect a negative sign for all the 
productivity related variables. Thus, we expect moral hazard incidence to decline with the 
increase in the level of productivity. This is because highly productive groups are more likely 
to get payoffs higher than the critical values to repay both their loan and that of any 
defaulting members. 
 
In concurrence with this line of thinking, Holmstrom (1979) in his paper on moral 
hazard and observability, shows that default penalties decrease with the increase in payoffs 
such that the incentive for moral hazard also decreases with a decline in penalty. In less 
productive groups, it is more likely that some members will not get enough returns (above 
the critical value for repayment to occur) to pay their loan, which will induce other members 
who have enough returns to avoid paying their loan too (strategic default). 
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b)  Screening 
 
The following variables were considered as proxies for the extent of screening: SCREEN 
is a variable which measures whether or not there are some non-members that were rejected 
by the group when they wanted to join the group. In addition there are three variables that 
capture the extent to which self selection is taking place during the group formation process. 
The variable PEERSELECT is used to capture whether or not a group was self-formed by 
the members. Ghatak (1999b) shows how adverse selection problems can be solved through 
group lending schemes that provide incentives for similar types to group together through 
self-selection. Peer selection is thus seen as key to improving repayment. We expect that the 
likelihood of incidence of moral hazard will be low among groups that are self formed.   
However, the implementation group lending with joint liability can be affected by a 
number of institutional and social cultural values in the communities. While the ideal 
situation requires group formation through the self selection process, it may not be possible 
under certain conditions. In this survey, for example, less than a third of the groups were 
formed by ordinary village residents (self-selection or peer selection), while the rest were 
formed either by the village chiefs or by the agricultural officers and credit assistants.   In 
this regard we include two extra variables to capture the extent of screening as follows:   
FASCREEN and VHSCREEN capturing the formation of groups by the extension workers 
and the village chief, respectively. All screening variables are dummies. We expect peer 
selection to have a negative impact on the incidence of moral hazard. However the impact of 
the two other screening variables is undetermined as it depends on the quality of screening 
and the influence that leaders have on the group. 
 
c)  Peer monitoring  
 
Following Stiglitz (1990), Conning (1999) and Aghion de (1999) we test the significance 
of peer monitoring variables in the moral hazard model.  We construct peer monitoring 
indicators following Diagne (1998) who  notes that in order for peer monitoring to be an 
effective substitute to the lender’s  own monitoring activities, group members must: 1) have 
better access to relevant information and 2) be willing to engage in peer monitoring activities 
to enforce proper loan use or report any incidence of moral hazard. The survey used two 
methods to obtain evidence of the two components. 
 
First, we capture the proportion of members responding “I don’t know” to specific 
questions on group composition and loan characteristic variables. The percentage of 
members from each group indicating that they lack knowledge of the group and loan 
characteristics  is taken as a measure of poor  access to relevant information and the quality 
of information flow within groups, respectively.  
 
As described above the variable GCOMPDNI measures the percent of group members 
not knowing group composition, while GLONCDNI measures the proportion of group 
members that don’t know the characteristics of the loan. With regards to loan characteristics 
the variable captured the knowledge of sizes, duration and interest rates. Both variables are 
assumed to be good indicators of monitoring. We expect the likelihood of moral hazard to 
increase with the proportion of individuals in a group reporting  that they don’t know their 
group composition and loan characteristics.  
 
Second, the survey captured the extent of monitoring by asking members whether they 
owned joint enterprise at group level (PMJOINTENT). This is a dummy variable and it is 
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equal 1 when it is reported that at least some members have joint enterprises within the 
group, and 0, otherwise. We expect that the incidence of moral hazard will be lower in 
groups that have joint enterprises due the effect of peer monitoring 
 
d)  Social ties and social capital 
 
Coleman (1993) observes that social capital functions as a source of social control. In 
concurrence with this notion Olomola (2000) notes that through social homogeneity, rule 
enforcement, and trust can.be reinforced, both of which will enhance social capital. Olomola 
observes that the capacity to enforce rules (social control) in groups where members are 
socially homogenous is higher than in groups with membership heterogeneity.  The 
proposition, leads to presumption that groups that are homogenous in terms of wealth, 
social status or kinship should have lower default rates than heterogeneous groups. Floro 
and Yotopolous (1991) show how the success of group lending can be attributed to its ability 
to harness social ties between borrowers to improve loan repayment.  This is based on the 
presumption that people that are close in terms of social ties know each other better and are 
more likely to be averse to harming each other through default. It is for this reason that most 
joint liability lending institutions will encourage homogenous group formation in terms of 
social status and wealth.  We use six variables to capture the magnitude of social ties within a 
borrowing group. COWEALTHHOMO is a proxy for wealth homogeneity of the group. It 
is equal 1 if the group is homogenous in terms of wealth and zero, otherwise. The incidence 
of moral hazard should be lower in groups that are homogenous in terms of wealth. 
VILLAGENUMBER measures the number of villages from which group members come. 
The larger the number of villages relative to the group sizes the smaller the social ties. This 
variable can also be a measure of the ease of monitoring. Groups composed of members 
from the same village are likely to know each other better and much easier to monitor than 
members coming from many villages. 
 
This variable is expected to have a positive sign.  PMFAMVG measures the presence of 
some members that come from the clan or family of a village headman in a group. The 
village chiefs have considerable influence on the operations of seasonal loans because of the 
MRFC requirements for their signatures before the fertilizer loan packages are delivered to 
club officials. The presence, therefore, of a village chief in the group or indeed his/her 
relative will have significant effects on the quality of interactions within the group. 
Considering the potential influence of the village chief on the behaviour of group members, 
we expect that moral hazard will be low if the chief is honest and high if the chief is 
dishonest as other members would want to default when they see that the chief has 
defaulted. However we don’t capture the extent of honest by the village chief. As such the 
expected sign for this variable is undetermined. 
POLITCLAN measures the presence in a group of members that are from the clan of a 
politician. Political leaders in Malawi have a significant impact on the way loan are perceived 
by the borrowers and this can have a significant impact on moral hazard behavior and hence 
repayment. The collapse in 1994 of a government administered credit program, the 
Smallholder Agricultural Credit Administration (SACA) was mainly attributed to the political 
influence. Politicians were blamed for sending conflicting messages to the borrowers during 
their political campaigns, such that most borrowers believed that the loans were donations 
from government. We, therefore, expect some political influence on groups that have social 
ties with politicians, although we don’t have a predetermined expectation as the type of 
influence will depend on the honesty of the politician in consideration. 
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CHAIRFAMILY represents the number of group members that belong to the family of 
a group chair person. Considering the strength of influence that the chairperson has on 
group members we expect that such influence could have implications on moral hazard. 
Nevertheless, the expected effect on moral hazard is undetermined because it depends on 
the character and values of the chairperson. 
The variable GENDERHOMO is a dummy capturing the homogeneity of gender in the 
group. It is equal one where the gender of the group is mixed and zero otherwise. We expect 
that gender homogeneity will reduce the incidence of moral hazard. 
 
e)  Peer pressure and sanctions 
 
The existence of peer pressure was captured by asking group leaders whether members 
in a group ever exerted pressure on their peers before and after the due date for the loan 
repayment. Active peer pressure was said to exist when members complained to the village 
authorities or threatened to take punitive action against defaulters. The way the question was 
phrased implies that peer pressure may only be captured in groups that had default 
problems.  A theoretical paper by Diagne (1998) predicts that peer pressure should be 
relevant only in groups that are heterogeneous in the incentive compatibility of the dynamic 
incentive constraints of its members. This only occurs in groups that are heterogeneous in 
risk.  However, in order to reduce that bias we only focus on peer pressure before the due 
date of the loan (PRESUDUEDATE). We expect peer pressure to have a negative impact of 
the incidence of moral hazard in the group.  
In addition, the presence of sanctions in the group was captured as an extra variable 
called LEFEXCMG. This variable captures the number of members that were excluded 
from the group in the previous loan cycle as a result of loan default or non-cooperative 
behaviour. We assume that this provides a picture on the extent to which sanctions are 
implemented among groups. We expect that the likelihood of moral hazard will decline with 
the evidence of sanctions in the group. 
 
f)  Dynamic incentives and further access to credit 
 
Dynamic incentives are based on stated preferences and willingness to pay as opposed to 
the actual behaviour. We expect the dynamic incentive constraints resulting from joint 
liability to create incentives for peer selection, peer monitoring and peer pressure. The value 
of future access to credit can best be captured by discounting benefits from future access to 
credit and comparing with benefits from not repaying. However, in the IFPRI survey, a 
revealed preference approach was used by asking the following question:  
If you are in a group where some members have defaulted but you have fully repaid your 
loan, and you were asked, in addition to loosing you 15 percent required deposit, to choose 
among the following three options, which one will you choose?  
1.  Contribute to repay in full the loans of defaulters, and be part of a new group where 
the defaulters are excluded 
2. Pay another 10% penalty and be part of a new group where the defaulters are 
excluded 
3. Accept a lower loan size next time and be part of a new group where the defaulters  
 are excluded 
The first option is directly related to the full joint liability principle (no loans to non 
defaulters until all loans are paid). The two other options were aimed at exploring alternative 
liability options (limited liability) which would maintain the same incentives for peer 
monitoring and peer pressure, both of which have direct relevance to the mitigation of moral 
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hazard.  Diagne et al (2000) notes that the key difference between the three options is that in 
the first one the penalty is dependent on the total amount of defaulted loans while it is not in 
the two other ones. The rationale behind these two alternative options is that they should 
lead to fewer strategic defaults compared to the first option. Therefore, the first option 
should lead to higher penalties among non-defaulters in a group where there are more 
defaulters. Groups choosing the first option are likely to attach higher value of the future 
access to credit. The second option is assumed to be more costly than the third option, as 
such those choosing the second option are assumed to attach a much higher value to future 
access to credit than those choosing the third option in which they would be willing to 
accept a lower value of the loan.  
 
We expect that the choice of either of the options is a good indicator of the importance 
or value that the group attaches to future access to credit. The inclusion of these variables in 
our model also helps us to explore the potential of limited liability contracts (as substitutes to 
full joint liability) in mitigating moral hazard. The two options are entered as dummy 
variables.   CONTRIB is equal 1  when the first option is chosen and PAY is equal 1 when 
the second option is chosen.   
 
An extra variable is included to capture dynamic incentives and the value of future access 
to credit. PASTACA captures the presence of at least one member in a group, who was from 
the past failed credit program where people defaulted and therefore the program was 
discontinued. The presence of such members in a group should increase the probability of 
moral hazard in the group as they may not attach the same value to credit access from the 
current institution following their past experience in a failed program. It is generally accepted 
that if clients have experienced former failed programs in which loans were never rigorously 
collected, there might be little incentive for them to comply to contracts in the new credit 
program (Buckley 1996). 
 
g)  Mismatching 
 
In order to capture incentive match in a group we introduce two variables in the model. 
First we include a measure of the age of the group (LONCYCLE). Theoretically, the age of a 
credit group is negatively associated with repayment. Paxton (1996) notes that as the age of 
the group increases group members acquiring different skills in their areas of 
entrepreneurship, such that they start developing divergent credit requirements. The 
matching problems arise  when the demand and supply for credit among group members 
can no longer match, which could lead to default by some members whose supply of credit 
is not incentive compatible. In most cases group lending starts with high repayment rates. 
However, this declines with time. Therefore, we expect the likelihood of moral hazard to 
increase with loan cycle.   
 
Second, we include a variable that captures the presence of new members in a group 
(NEWMMBAVG) at the beginning of the loan cycle.  Screening among groups is 
continuous as group members continue to exclude bad risk borrowers and replace them with 
safe ones. However, this could also lead to a matching problem sighted by Paxton (1996). 
The matching problem arises when credit terms and conditions are no longer appropriate for 
each member as credit is repeated again. Though not necessarily in the same context as 
mentioned by Paxton, the presence of new members in a group potentially introduces the 
same problem since they enter the group after their colleagues have already developed 
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several entrepreneurship skills that also change their credit requirements. We expect that the 
presence of a matching problem in a group will increase the likelihood of moral hazard.  
 
h)  Control variables 
 
In addition, we included in the model control variables that are program dummies for 
the maize group (MAIZE), cotton group (COTTON), and non-farm income generating 
activity group (NONFARM ). Group size (GPSIZE) is the number of members in a group. 
Following de Aghion (1999)  the effect of groups size on loan repayment can be 
multifaceted with opposing effects. As indicated in the literature review we expect that group 
size will affect moral hazard behaviour in 4 ways as follows: 1) the free-riding effect, 2) the 
joint responsibility effect, 3) cost sharing effect and the commitment effect. Thus the 
expected sign for group size on moral hazard is undetermined. We also include the value of 
the maximum amount of credit a group can access at any time, known as the credit limit 
(CREDLIMIT), as a control variable. Its impact on moral hazard is ambiguous. 
 
  
5.  Empirical results and discussion 
 
The maximum likelihood probit estimates of the above moral hazard equation are 
presented in Table 5.  
In line with a priori expectations, results indicate that groups formed through peer 
selection have a lower incidence of moral hazard. This implies that peer selection enables 
groups to screen risky borrowers which is in concurrence with Ghatak’s theory of adverse 
selection. Ghatak (1999a) observes that self selection process leads to the emergence of a 
pool of safe borrowers which can lead to a reduction in the likelihood of moral hazard. Both 
peer monitoring variables are significant and their signs conform to the a priori expectations.  
First the proportion of group members reporting that they do not know the composition of 
the group has a positive and significant coefficient. This signifies the non-occurrence of 
monitoring in some groups, which increases the likelihood of moral hazard. The presence of 
individuals with joint enterprises has a reducing effect on the incidence of moral hazard. 
This conforms to a priori expectations that moral hazard is less likely in groups with joint 
enterprises because members are more likely to monitor each other’s investment decisions 
and the levels of output.  
Only one of the variables measuring levels of social ties , the number of villages from 
which group members come is significant, with an a priori expected sign. As a spatial 
variable, this implies that groups with members from villages that are further apart face 
difficulties in peer monitoring. Secondly, the members from different villages are less likely 
to exhibit strong pre-existing social ties, such that they may not know each other well which 
would lead to the inclusion of risky borrowers within the group.  
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Table 5: Determinants of   Moral hazard-Maximum likelihood Probit estimates 
 
Variable Coeff. Z-statistic 
dx
dy
8 
Production factors       PRODARABLE -0.215 -1.54 -0.038 
PRODLEVELSCH -0.201 -1.31 0.036 
Screening                      SCREEN -0.042 -0.11 0.009 
SCRFA -0.319 -0.63 -0.083 
PEERSELECT -0.838* -1.66 -0.428 
SCRVGHEAD -0.311 -0.5 -0.018 
Peer monitoring            PMJOINTENT -0.608* -1.87 -0.294 
GCOMPDNI 3.266* 1.77 0.203 
GLONCDNI -1.828 -1.07 0.034 
Social ties                     VILLAGENUM~R 0.377*** 3.39 0.056 
PMFAMVG -0.251 -0.58 -0.129 
CHAIRFAMILY -0.046 -0.77 0.001 
Peer pressure                    PRESUDUEDATE -1.025** -2.02 -0.329 
LEFEXCMG 0.279 1.3 -0.037 
Dynamic incentives     CONTRIBPAY -1.311** -2.36 -0.415 
PAYPENATY -0.265 -0.5 0.011 
PASTSACA 1.200** 2.25 0.383 
Matching problem (incentive match)    
NEWMMBAVG 0.306*** 3.23 0.309 
LCYCLE 0.478** 2.51 0.116 
Control                          GPSIZE 0.025 0.68 0.005 
MAXIDLMG 0.001** 2.0 0.001 
MAIZE -0.694 -1.08 -0.351 
COTTON -0.654 -1 -0.174 
NONFARM 0.211 0.44 -0.037 
LILONGWE 1.553** 2.06 0.538 
ZOMBA 1.927*** 2.77 0.648 
NKHOTA 2.385* 1.81 0.663 
Constant -1.436 -1.28  
Total  observations 99   
Observation with dependent =0 58   
% Correctly predicted 72.73   
Wald chi2(23) 44.72   
Prob > chi2 0.009   
Pseudo R2 0.3315   
Log pseudo-likelihood  45.64   
Source: Own calculation from RDD/IFPRI 1999 Rural Finance Survey 
Note: * P<0.10; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01 , 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 The marginal effects measure the  changes in a regressor  on the conditional probability that 1=y . The 
marginal effect of regressor ix  is expressed as follows: 
idx
xyd )|1Pr( =
= jix ββφ )'( ,  where jβ  is the 
sign of the marginal effect 
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The presence of peer pressure has a significant and negative impact on the incidence of 
moral hazard. This is in conformity with our a priori expectation. This finding also conforms 
to the finding by Wydick (1999), in which he observes that the willingness to apply peer 
pressure has a significant effect on reducing moral hazard within borrowing groups from 
Guatemala. The presence of social sanctions returned a conflicting sign but it is insignificant. 
 
The dynamic incentives captured by the willingness to pay a full value of defaulted loans, 
which is also a measure of the willingness to accept full joint liability is negative and 
significant. The implication is that the full joint liability clause is a key mechanism through 
which the incidence of moral hazard can be minimized. The variable capturing the 
preference for limited liability where individuals are only required to pay 10 percent penalty 
is insignificant. The findings are consistent with a priori expectations in that full joint liability 
strengthens togetherness in the group which makes it less likely that individuals would want 
to harm each other through default. The presence of members from past failed programs in 
a group has a significant and positive coefficient. This conforms to a priori expectations that 
members that have ever participated in previously failed credit programs where loans were 
not rigorously collected have a tendency to take risky actions that have a negative impact on 
repayment. In the same context, Buckley (1996) discusses the abandonment of offers in joint 
liability lending programs. Buckley notes that a problem arises with JLLIs in that the 
institution sometimes keeps the group but abandons the joint liability which is the pillar of 
group lending. Buckley likens the situation to the abandonment of joint liability in 
Smallholder Agricultural Credit Administration (SACA) in Malawi. He notes that at first 
SACA lent to individuals under joint liability and the repayment was good. However, in 1992 
SACA adopted a policy of allowing any individual that had repaid his or her own loan to 
access further credit even if one or more of the borrowers in his/her group was in default. 
This led to a severe drop in repayment rates.  
Both variable capturing mismatching problems conform to a priori expectations by 
returning positive and significant coefficients. First, the presence of new members in a group 
is likely to introduce a matching problem as the loan demand for new members may not 
match those of old members due to differences in the levels of business skills. This in turn 
makes it difficult for the lending institutions to meet the loan demand for such a diverse 
group of individuals leading to an erosion of incentives for repayment among some 
members whose loan supply does not create the incentive to repay. Second, the variable that 
measures the age of a group has a positive effect on moral hazard. Again this is related to the 
matching problem in loan cycles proposed by Paxton (1996). In the first meeting every one 
agrees to the terms and conditions of the loan. However, as members continue to receive 
loans from a lending institution; they develop skills at different levels. This leads to a 
diversity in their loan requirements which in turn makes it difficult for the lender to match 
the demand and supply of credit among group members. As more members become 
unsatisfied, the incentive for repayment declines leading to moral hazard. Both productivity 
variables had no significant impact on the incidence of moral hazard, although they returned 
expected signs. 
 The maximum loan size available to the group increases the likelihood of moral hazard. 
This is consistent with theoretical proposition by Stiglitz(1990) in which it is observed that 
the expected utility of risky projects increases faster in loaned funds than that of a safe 
project. This assumes that an increase in the loan size increases the relative attractiveness of 
risky projects leading to moral hazard. Other control variables such as group size and 
program dummies were insignificant.  
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6.   Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
Joint Liability Lending (JLL) is celebrated as an innovation that has made previously 
insolvent individuals solvent by creating ‘social collateral` to replace the missing physical 
collateral that excluded them from access to more traditional forms of finance. Nevertheless, 
the problem with joint liability lending programs is that the poor are given access to credit 
without collateral, and in the event of default, they can not be punished beyond a mere 
denial of future access to credit. This form of limited liability can induce borrowers to take 
risky actions. While theorists have attempted to propose conditions under which joint 
liability contracts can be self enforcing to the extent that moral hazard would be minimized, 
the performance of joint liability lending programs has produced mixed results. In addition, 
empirical studies that investigate extent to which moral hazard occurs and determinants of 
its occurrence in such programs are rare.  
 
The objective of the study was, therefore, to examine the extent to which moral hazard 
occurs in credit groups and analyze the determinants of the likelihood of its occurrence. 
Guided by theoretical propositions of Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), Diagne (1998) Paxton 
(1996) and Ahlin and Townsend (2003) the study is an attempt to contribute to moral hazard 
literature by testing the extent to which peer-selection, peer-monitoring, social ties, peer-
pressure, dynamic incentives and matching problems can be used to explain the incidence of 
moral hazard.  
 
Results indicate that in Malawi, despite the high potential of joint liability lending in 
mitigating moral hazard, the mechanism is still prone to moral hazard. About 40 percent of 
the credit groups reported that they experienced either a misuse of funds or a 
mismanagement of an investment by some of their group members.  Our analysis further 
shows that the likelihood of occurrence of moral hazard is lower in groups that were 
endogenously formed through peer selection. Peer monitoring through rules that encourage 
joint enterprise ownership reduces the incidence of moral hazard. The degree of pre-existing 
social ties captured by the number of villages from which group members come as well as 
the existence of peer pressure, particularly, before the due date of the loan reduce the 
likelihood of the incidence of moral hazard. These findings offer support to theoretical 
propositions by Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Diagne (1998).   
 
Indicating the significance of the matching problem, results show that the number of 
new members in a group and the number of loan cycles lead to a rise in the incidence of 
moral hazard. This finding is consistent with the proposition by Paxton (1996). Normally, 
new members join the group because either some old members are excluded from the group 
for non-compliance, or they left willfully. In microfinance literature, the number of dropouts 
from the program is a strong indicator of whether or not the financial services needs for the 
beneficiaries are being met. To reduce the problem of high dropouts which leads to 
replacements by new members, microfinance institutions require constant appraisals of their 
activities to ensure that they address the needs of their clientele.  
 
With regard to dynamic incentives, results show that the full joint liability as captured in 
the willingness of group members to pay a full amount of defaulter’s loan has great potential 
as lending technology that can be used to minimize the incidence of moral hazard. The 
limited liability, chosen by those that are only willing to pay a 10 percent penalty for default 
works against repayment in that it increases the incidence of moral hazard. The results on 
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the role of dynamic incentives imply that dynamic incentives can be used as a discipline 
device for borrowers that want to take risky actions and that through the creation of proper 
incentives borrowers will be persuaded to behave in an honest manner. The emergence of 
several microfinance institutions, some with conflicting objectives, has created alternatives 
for bad borrowers such that defaulters in one credit program would borrow from another 
credit program without facing any sanctions. This seriously reduces the value such members 
may attach to accessing credit from a particular institution particularly when they know that 
they can still borrow from other institutions. A policy initiative that supports the 
establishment of credit burros from which past records for potential borrowers can be 
accessed must be promoted. This would stop bad borrowers from accessing further funds. 
Nevertheless, such a policy must be supported by a legislature that introduces mandatory 
identity cards for all citizens. Other policies that would reduce mismatching problems and 
enhance dynamic incentives relate to the introduction of combined offers that include both 
joint and individual liability by microfinance institutions. This will require MFIs to relax their 
rule on joint liability by allowing borrowers with dynamic and growing investments who 
make use of group loans at the beginning to switch to individual credit offers when they are 
in need of higher loans. 
 
The findings on peer selection have important policy implications. Policies that advocate 
group formation or the creation of associations for purposes of improving access to credit 
by the poor should ascertain that such groupings are endogenously self-formed with 
minimum intervention from credit officers. The self-selection process will facilitate screening 
of potentially bad borrowers and thus would enhance the formation of groups with strong 
pre-existing social ties which are important for strengthening the interdependency between 
group members which is needed for strong intra-group insurance. The current government 
policy of promoting the formation of credit associations and introducing tougher penalties 
for defaulters is unlikely to yield tangible results unless supported by a proper group 
formation process that reduces adverse selection.  The findings on the effect of peer 
monitoring, peer pressure and social ties in mitigating moral hazard imply that joint liability 
lending institutions must continue relying on social cohesion in order to reduce the incidence 
of moral hazard and in so doing they will be simultaneously addressing problems of low 
outreach, limited impact and lack of financial self sustainability, all of which are key pillars of 
the Triangle of Microfinance. 
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Appendix 2 : Descriptive statistics of regression variables 
 
Variables Description Mean   S.D Exp 
sign 
Dependent variable     
HAZARD(1=yes)                  
                  0=otherwise  
Whether some members wilfully defaulted or misused the loan 0.42 0.49  
Independent variables      
Productivity     
AVGLAND Average land holding of group members in hectares 3.17 1.471 - 
EDUCATION Average years of formal education of group members 4.72 1.533 - 
Screening     
SCREEN Whether some individuals who wanted to join the group rejected 0.439  0.490 - 
FASCREEN Group was formed by the Agricultural extension worker (1=yes, 0=no) 0.46  0.499 - 
PEERSELECT Whether group was initiated by peers (1=yes, 0=no)  0.241 0.428 - 
VHSCREEN Group was formed by the Village headman (1=yes, 0=no) 0.12  0.321 -+ 
Peer monitoring     
JOINTENTERP Members have joint enterprises (1=have joint enterprises)   0.6  0.533 - 
GCOMPNAI Percentage of group members not knowing group composition 0.066 0.147 + 
GLONCNAI Percentage of member not knowing loan characteristics     + 
Social ties     
COWEALTHOMO An index of wealth heterogeneity (1=Group is homogenous) 0.14 0.343 - 
VILLAGENUMBER Number of villages from which members come 2.76 2.039 + 
PMFAMVG At least one member is from the family of a village headman (1=yes)  0.82 0.383 -+ 
POLITCLAN Number of members from the clan of a politician 0.61 1.083 -+ 
CHAIRFAMILY Number of members from the family of club chair person 1.50 3.012 -+ 
GENDERHOMO Whether gender composition of the group is mixed (1=yes, 0=no) 0.57 0.496 - 
Peer pressure     
PRESUDUEDATE Whether group exerted pressure before due date (1=yes) 0.14 0.349 - 
LEFEXCMG Number of members that  were excluded from group (sanctions) 0.27 1.080 - 
Dynamic Incentives         
CONTRIBPAY Whether would be willing to pay full cost of defaulters loan (1=yes, 0=no) 0.46 0.500 - 
PAYPENATY Would only be willing to pay ten percent penalty 0.37 0.485 + 
PAST SACA At least one member was from past failed credit programs (1=yes, 0=no)  0.78 0.415 + 
Incentive Match     
NEWMMBAVG Number of new members in the group 1.41 2.732 + 
LONCYCLE The loan cycle for which loan was received (1-5) 2.74 1.051 + 
Control  Variables     
GPSIZE Number of members at the start of the season in a credit group 16.84 5.563 -+ 
CREDLIMIT Average Credit limit in a group per individual 4642.
38 
3822.
1 
+ 
MAIZE Dummy for maize credit group (1=maize, 0=otherwise) 0.19 0.393 -+ 
COTTON Dummy for cotton credit group (1=maize,0=otherwise) 0.042 0.201 -+ 
NON-FARM Dummy for non-farm credit group (1=maize 0=otherwise) 0.30 0.462 -+ 
Source: RDD/IFPRI 1999 Rural Finance Survey 
 
